Abstract

Complex Internet attacks may come from multiple sources, and target multiple networks and technologies. Nevertheless, Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems (CIDS) emerges as a promising solution by using information from multiple sources to gain a better understanding of objective and impact of complex Internet attacks. CIDS also help to cope with classical problems of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) such as zero-day attacks, high false alarm rates and architectural challenges, e. g., centralized designs exposing the Single-Point-of-Failure. Improved complexity on the other hand gives raise to new exploitation opportunities for adversaries. The contribution of this paper is twofold. We first investigate related research on CIDS to identify the common building blocks and to understand vulnerabilities of the Collaborative Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF). Second, we focus on the problem of anonymity preservation in a decentralized intrusion detection related message exchange scheme. We use techniques from design theory to provide multi-path peer-to-peer communication scheme where the adversary can not perform better than guessing randomly the originator of an alert message.

@InProceedings{bye:2010:CollSec,
author = {Rainer Bye and Seyit A. Camtepe and Sahin Albayrak},
title = {Collaborative Intrusion Detection Framework: Characteristics, Adversarial Opportunities and Countermeasures},
Booktitle = {CollSec: Usenix Workshop on Collaborative Methods for Security and Privacy},
year = {2010}
}